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Laß dir nichts einreden,
Sieh selber nach!
Was du nicht selber weißt,
Weißt du nicht.
Prüfe die Rechnung,
Du mußt sie bezahlen. 
Bertolt Brecht 
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INTRODUCTION
(English)
This thesis is organized in three clearly differentiated chapters. The three of them 
deal  with  currently  relevant  issues:  The  effect  of  low-quality  of  standardized  tests  on 
research, the high levels of political  corruption in Spain and the collective capacity of 
tackle climate change.
In the first chapter  “Straightening PISA: When Students do not Want to 
Answer Standardized Tests”, I study one of the key elements on current education 
policies: The standardized-tests. Concretely, I analyze how students approach standardized 
tests in different ways. I use a measure of effort exerted by students belonging to different 
countries and social groups in order to assess the impact of low effort on the student's final 
score. The measure links an acknowledged psychological tests (Dot-Counting test) with one 
PISA-item, in which students had to merely count dots. In this chapter, I measure to 
which extent different effort levels may distort the score of students. This problem would 
affect social-science research when standardized-tests are use. At the end of the chapter, I 
propose a simple solution to design standard tests which would eliminate this problem. 
Given the  importance  of  standardized-tests  on  the  design  of  education  programs,  this 
paper may be a contribution to implement more accurate education policies.
The second chapter focuses on one key issue of Spanish current political crisis: The 
level of political corruption. Political institutions developed during the Spanish transition 
to democracy are currently criticized due to their inability to stop political corruption. For 
instance,  Spanish  Attorney  Generals  are  appointed  by  the  government  and  their 
impartiality  is  usually  criticized.  In  “Stories  on  Corruption:  How  Media  and 
Prosecutors Influence Elections”,  I analyze systematically the partiality of the last 
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two Attorney Generals. Concretely, I study whether Attorney Generals try to influence 
elections by adjusting the  tempo of  their  investigations to the electoral  calendar. This 
possibility is combined with the mass media editorial decisions. I analyze whether mass 
media have a partisan bias and hide corruption activities of their preferred parties. For 
doing so, I have created a unique database: I have coded the number of articles containing 
the word “corruption” of the two main Spanish newspapers “El Pais” and “El Mundo” 
every week in the last ten years. After the econometric analysis I found significant evidence 
of the partisan behavior of both the Attorney Generals and mass media. 
The  last  chapter  is  a  joint  work  with  Karolina  Safarzynska  from  the 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien. 
“Responding to the Climate Change Challenge: Experimental Evidence” 
tackles the problem of climate change and the capacity of societies to overcome it. This 
chapter has also a different methodology. Precisely, it is based on experimental methods. 
We consider  isolated groups of  individuals  which must  extract resources  form a 
renewable common-pool. The novelty is the study of the impact of resource uncertainty on 
individual harvests  in  common-pool  resource dilemmas together  with the possibility of 
group collapse. The uncertainty is modeled as a weather shock diminishing the groups' 
resources, which is drawn from the distribution known in advance to participants. On the 
other hand, the group collapses if the resources go below a certain threshold. In that case 
all  accumulated  resource-extraction  get  lost.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  the  minimum 
harvests below which a group does not have sufficient nutrition to survive. 
We  find  that  in  the  long  run,  sufficiently  severe  weather  shocks  can  induce 
individuals to conserve resources. However, in the short-run uncertainty leads to resources 
over-exploitation. In addition, our results suggest that resource uncertainty undermines 
effectiveness of costly sanctioning. In some treatments, individuals can punish others at 
their own cost. We found that the possibility to punish others induce individuals to harvest 
significantly more resources in the beginning of the experiment, compared to the situation 
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when sanctioning is not possible. The presence of punishment paradoxically increases the 
probability of resource exhaustion. We interpret these results in the context of the World 
climate  change.  We  conclude  that  the  positive  impact  of  environmental  pressure  on 
individual behavior and the effect of new institutions are likely to come too late to prevent 
damage to the environment.
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INTRODUZIONE
(Italiano)
Questa  tesi  è  organizzata  in  tre  capitoli  chiaramente differenziati.  I  tre  capitoli 
riguardano  argomenti  attualmente  rilevanti:  l’effetto  della  bassa  qualità  dei  test 
standardizzati  in  ricerca,  gli  alti  livelli  di  corruzione  politica  in  Spagna e  la  capacità 
collettiva di rispondere ai cambiamenti climatici.
Nel primo capitolo “Rafforzando PISA: quando gli studenti non vogliono fare i test 
standardizzati”, studio uno degli elementi chiave nelle attuali politiche per l’educazione: i 
test  standardizzati.  Concretamente,  analizzo  come  gli  studenti  affrontano  i  test 
standardizzati  in  modi  differenti.  Uso  una  misura  di  sforzo  fatto  degli  studenti  che 
appartengono a Paesi diversi e gruppi sociali diversi per stimare l’impatto del basso sforzo 
nel punteggio finale degli studenti. La misura collega un test psicologico molto affermato (il 
test di conta dei punti) con una domanda del test PISA, nella quale gli studenti devono 
semplicemente contare i punti. In questo capitolo, misuro fino a che punto diversi livelli di 
sforzo  fatto  degli  studenti  possono  distorcere  il  punteggio  del  PISA.  Questo  problema 
avrebbe degli effetti sulla ricerca nelle scienze sociali, quando vengono utilizzati i risultati 
dei test standardizzati. Alla fine del capitolo, propongo una semplice soluzione per il design 
di  test  standardizzati  che  elimini  questo  problema.  Data  l’importanza  dei  test 
standardizzati  nel  design  dei  programmi  educativi,  questo  articolo  potrebbe  essere  un 
contributo per implementare politiche educative più accurate.
Il secondo capitolo si focalizza su uno dei temi chiave della attuale crisi politica 
spagnola: il livello di corruzione. Le istituzioni politiche sviluppate durante la transizione 
spagnola  verso  la  democrazia  sono  attualmente  sotto  forte  critica  a  causa  della  loro 
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incapacità nel fermare la corruzione politica. Per esempio, i procuratori generali spagnoli 
sono nominati dal governo e la loro imparzialità è spesso criticata. Nel capitolo “Storie 
sulla  corruzione:  come  i  media  e  I  procuratori  influenzano  le  elezioni”,  analizzo 
sistematicamente la parzialità degli ultimi due procuratori generali. Concretamente, studio 
se i procuratori generali tentano di influenzare le elezioni modificando la tempistica delle 
loro indagini adattandola al calendario elettorale. Questa possibilità è combinata con le 
decisioni  editoriali  dei  mass  media.  Analizzo  se  i  mass  media  hanno  un  pregiudizio 
ideologico e nascondono le storie di corruzione dei loro partiti preferiti. Per fare questo, ho 
creato  un  database  unico:  ho  codificato  il  numero  di  articoli  contenenti  la  parola 
“corruzione”  nei  due  quotidiani  principali  spagnoli,  “El  Pais”  e  “El  Mundo”,  ogni 
settimana negli ultimi dieci anni. Dopo un’analisi econometria ho scoperto una evidenza 
significativa di un comportamento partigiano sia  dei  procuratori  generali  che dei  mass 
media. 
L’ultimo  capitolo  è  un  lavoro  congiunto  con  Karolina  Safarzynska  della 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien.
“Rispondendo alla sfida del cambiamento climatico: evidenze sperimentali” affronta 
il  problema del cambiamento climatico e la capacità delle società di superarlo. Questo 
capitolo usa una metodologia differente. Precisamente si basa su metodi sperimentali.
 Noi consideriamo gruppi isolati di individui che devono estrarre risorse da un bacino di 
risorse rinnovabili.
La novità è lo studio dell’impatto dell’incertezza di risorse sui raccolti individuali nei 
dilemma dei  bacini  di  risorse  rinnovabili,  unita  alla  possibilità  che  il  gruppo  collassi. 
L’incertezza è modellata come uno shock atmosferico che diminuisce le risorse dei gruppi, 
che è estratto da una distribuzione conosciuta in anticipo dai partecipanti. D’altro canto il 
gruppo collassa se le risorse scendono sotto una certa soglia. In quel caso tutta l’estrazione 
accumulata di risorse viene persa. Questo potrebbe essere interpretato come il  minimo 
raccolto sotto al quale il gruppo non ha nutrimento sufficiente per sopravvivere.
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Scopriamo  che  nel  lungo  termine,  shock  atmosferici  abbastanza  severi  possono 
indurre gli individui a conservare le risorse. Comunque, nel breve termine l’incertezza porta 
ad un sovrasfruttamento delle risorse. Inoltre, i nostri risultati suggeriscono che l’incertezza 
nelle risorse danneggia l’effettività del sanzionamento costoso. In alcuni trattamenti, gli 
individui possono punire altri pagando un costo. Scopriamo che la possibilità di punire 
altri  induce  gli  individui  a  raccogliere  significativamente  più  risorse  all’inizio 
dell’esperimento, comparato alla situazione in cui il  sanzionamento non è possibile.  La 
presenza della punizione paradossalmente incrementa la probabilità di un esaurimento delle 
risorse.  Interpretiamo questi  risultati  nel  contesto del cambiamento climatico mondiale. 
Concludiamo  che  l’impatto  positivo  della  pressione  climatica  sul  comportamento 
individuale  e  l’effetto  di  nuove  istituzioni  probabilmente  arrivano  troppo  tardi  per 
prevenire un danno all’ambiente. 
17/113
18/113
Straightening PISA:
When Students do not Want to Answer Standardized Tests.
Abstract
In this paper I analyze how students approach standardized tests in different ways. I use a 
measure of effort exerted by students belonging to different countries and social groups in 
order to assess the impact of low effort on the student's final score. I demonstrate how this 
can  distort  the  results  of  researches  who  use  standardized  test  databases  (eg.  those 
provided by PISA). I propose a simple solution to design standard tests that eliminate this 
problem.
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1. Introduction
There is a large amount of money invested in international standardized tests which 
try to measure the knowledge, skills and cognitive abilities of students from all around the 
world. Periodically, media show the results of the last PISA test, and the position of the 
own country is analyzed in depth by experts on education. Moreover, there is a growing 
amount of national standardized tests looking for the performance of schools, regions and 
provinces within countries. 
All  those  studies  are  used  in  many  scientific  articles  and  institutional  reports, 
covering a wide spectrum of topics and perspectives. Some scholars use those tests to look 
for links between economic growth, mortality, productivity or inequality and school quality, 
using a macro-economic perspective (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Bosworth and Collins, 
2003;  Jamison,  Jamison,  and  Hanushek  2006,  Soto  2006,  Altinok  and  Murseli  2007, 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009, Barro and Lee 2010). Other scientists analyze the impact 
of different school systems or the effectiveness of private schooling in the light of these test 
results  (Vandenberghe,  2003;  Dronkers,  2008).  In  addition,  there  are  single-country 
analyses (Simola 2005, Sahlberg 2007, or Lokan, Geenwood, Cresswell 2008), and cross-
country comparisons (Kim, Lavonen and Ogawa 2009; Martin 2004). Finally, there is a 
group  of  studies  which  analyze  the  knowledge  acquired  by  certain  sub-populations  of 
students. They compare mainly the test performance between immigrants and natives or 
between female and male within and across countries (Creswell 2002; Ammermüller 2005; 
OECD 2006; Schleicher 2006; White 2007). Consequently, all these reports build the basis 
for national and international educational policies (e.g. Erlt 2006, Backes-Gellner and Veen 
2008, Lundahl and Waldow, 2009, Lundgren 2010). 
However, these tests are surrounded by an aura of skepticism. Some authors have 
written a holistic critic about standardized tests, in which they are arguing that such tests 
are unable to measure the main aspects of educational life (Rochex 2006, Sjøberg 2007). 
Other researchers criticize more technical aspects of the tests. They point out the secrecy 
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of the items, (Rochex 2006 , Yus Ramos et al 2011), the limitation to pen and paper 
problems (Sjøberg 2007) and the cultural differences across countries that may affect how a 
question is understood or how a given topic is taught in class (McQueen and Mendelovits 
2003, Rochex 2006, Fensham 2007). Furthermore, there is a large number of authors who 
have criticized the translation of the items (Grisay, 2002, McQueen and Mendelovits 2003) 
or the design of the items itself (Rochex 2006, Dohn 2007 , Yus Ramos et al 2011 and 
Alcaraz Salarirche et al 2011).
One  of  the  oldest  critiques  to  this  kind  of  tests  is  that  they  require  total 
collaboration  of  the  surveyed  students,  who  should  exert  a  large  effort  on  the  test 
(Borghans, et. Al 2007 , Sjøberg 2007).  From a theoretical point of view, this view is 
defended by several authors (eg.  William 2008) and empirically, many have analyzed the 
role of effort in standardized tests, specially in PISA and TIMSS. For instance, Baumert 
and Demmrich  (2001) conducted  an experiment  with  different  treatments  in  order  to 
increase the effort of test-takers. They found that it would be possible to increase the effort 
of PISA-test-takers by giving financial rewards or feedback. Also Wise and DeMars (2011) 
consider  the  possibility  of  student  making  “fast-guessing”  decisions  in  the  test.  These 
authors proposed a method to filter them.
This paper analyzes the importance of low motivation in the students' final test 
score  and  quantifies  its  impact  on  PISA-test-takers.  Furthermore,  it  looks  for  the 
determinants  of  full  cooperation,  and  it  shows  the  potential  bias  cross-country  and 
individual-level studies, if the lack of collaboration of students is not considered.
Section 2 explains whether different students present different degrees of willingness 
to answer (WTA). This will be followed by an analysis of how the WTA of students can be 
measured by using certain PISA-test items. Then I will show the similarities between the 
PISA-test items and psychological tests which measure low collaboration.  
Section 3 presents a statistical summary of the econometric techniques used for the 
analysis of the PISA database. It shows the approach used to find the potential bias in 
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individual-level and a cross-country studies. 
Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. I carry out a round of regressions 
where the endogenous variable is the PISA-test score. I analyze whether the coefficient of 
selected explanatory variables changes if  the WTA of the student is  considered. I also 
measure the total effect of the WTA on the student PISA-test score. The effects of a 
measurement problem due to the differences on WTA across countries is also analyzed. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and adds some recommendations. Concretely, the 
results show how not considering the WTA of students leads, at best, to low t-values and, 
in general, to biased results on the studies that use standardized tests.  The end of this 
section contains also a proposal to better quantify the WTA of students. This measure can 
be implemented in the future in order to solve the problem analyzed.
2. Willingness to answer standardized tests.
The quality of the data gathered determines the quality of standardized tests. Good 
data assumes, of course, that the respondents do their best to answer the questions of 
standardized tests  and that they are willing to concentrate on the test-items (Sjøberg 
2007).
In order to study the effort of standard test takers, we can start by analyzing how a 
standardized test takes place. According to the PISA-test administrator manual of 2000, 
the PISA-test takes approximately three hours. The instructions are read for ten to fifteen 
minutes. Then the students start to answer the cognitive test divided into two parts with a 
braek in between from five to twenty minutes. Once the second part of the test is finished, 
students receive a questionnaire in order to collect personal data (OECD 2000a). The time 
for the test may be excessive (Sjøberg 2007), and even other similar tests such us TIMSS 
require less time. For instance in the 2003 version, the TIMSS-test took 72 minutes for the 
4th grade and 90 for the 8th grade (IEA 2003).
It is noteworthy that there is no economic reward for answering properly, that there 
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is no feedback on their own performance and no information about the right solutions is 
distributed  among  the  students.  Sjøberg  (2007)  discusses  that  students  of  different 
countries react very differently to such test situations due to their cultural environment 
and to their attitudes towards school and education. He explains how a Taiwanese school 
director, before a standardized test, gathered students and parents giving them a speech 
about the significant task that they were facing. After that, and prior to the test, the 
students marched while the national anthem was played (Sjøberg 2007).
The importance of the willingness to answer (WTA) in different tests is not a new 
issue. More than forty years ago, scholars have already identified this problem (Borghans, 
et. al 2007). Some empirical studies have shown how the reward through performance-
related prizes, both in cash or in candies, increases IQ test scores and the outcome of other 
standardized tests (Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2003; and Pailing and Segalowitz 
2004).
To  overcome  the  problem  of  low  WTA,  psychologists  have  developed  several 
psychometric tools. These tools try to calibrate the level of effort or collaboration of test 
takers. The four most used tests are the Rey 15-Item Test, the Dot Counting Test, the Rey 
Word Recognition Test, and the B Test (Nitch and Gassmire 2007). The validity of these 
tools  relies  on  the  floor-effect  principle,  which  is  that  their  demanded tasks  are  easy 
enough for all individuals, even with neuropsychological deficits (Rogers, Harrell, and Liff, 
1993). 
I will concentrate on the Dot Counting test due to its similarities with an item of 
the PISA-test. The standard version of the Dot Counting test consists on twelve cards with 
varying numbers of dots which range from 7 to 28. Subjects are asked to count the dots 
and verbalize their counts as fast as possible (Boone, Lu, and Herzberg, 2002). The fact 
that counting is one of the earliest, most important number skills that children learn and 
use (Nye, Fluck and Buckley, 2001), is the main reason for using dot counting as a valid 
measure of effort and collaboration. 
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Studies which use this technique have shown that, even considering the forced stress 
of the situation, normal individuals commit errors in only 10% of the trials (Beetar and 
Williams 1995). A higher percentage of mistakes must be explained by a low effort exertion 
(Beetar and Williams 1995).
The PISA-test presents a similar question to the Dot Counting test, namely the 
question M136Q01T from PISA 2000 (see illustration 1). In this question students have to 
count a certain number of points and crosses ranging from 1 to 32. The second part of the 
question asks for further computations, namely guessing the number of dots which the 
consecutive set of dots and crosses should have.  Students receive points only if the second 
part of the question is correctly answer. Fortunately, the database of PISA is coded in such 
way that it shows whether the adolescents counted the dots correctly.
ILLUSTRATION 1
Samples of M136Q01T and Dot-Counting test
From the PISA-test, 35.2% of the students made a mistake when counting the dots. 
Even though,  students were not under time pressure; could keep the figures with the dots 
in front of them, allowing for further re-counting, and were provided with pen an paper. 
The  number  of  registered  mistakes  is  three  times  more  than  the  Dot-Counting  test 
considers as normal for motivated individuals. All students are able to count as PISA-test 
monitors are instructed not to give the test to those individuals mentally unable to do it 
(OECD 2000a). Being this is the case, we should accept that there is a large amount of 
exam takers who are not fully collaborative or who are not willing to answer.
Four the analysis, I henceforth consider that individuals are willing to answer the 
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test only if they counted correctly the points.
An important issue is that the number of correct answers is not equally divided 
across countries. If the low percentage of correct answers came from aleatory mistakes, 
then the percentage of mistakes should be the same in all the countries were PISA-test is 
carried out. Graph 1 illustrates these differences.
GRAPH 1
Percentage of correct counting per country
Furthermore,  the  WTA does  not  vary  only  across  countries,  but  it  changes  at 
different points of time during the PISA-test. At the beginning, students may be more 
keen  to answer carefully  but  at  the  end the may be  tired,  bored,  upset,  or  even,  as 
mentioned by the School quality monitor manual, “totally out of control” (OECD 2000a). 
These factors influence the psychological condition of the student and therefore reduce 
their motivation (Pajares 2007).
This  is  reflected  in  the  percentage  of  number  of  students  who  count  the  dot 
correctly when the dot-counting question is situated in different positions within the PISA-
test. Precisely, the percentage of right counts decreases when the question is situated later 
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on the test.  If  the  Counting-Dot-question is  situated at  the beginning of  the test  (at 
position 9), 67% of students answer correctly. However, when the question is situated at 
the very end of the test (at position 56), the percentage of correct answers declines to 
64.8%.
TABLE 1
Frequency of WTA students at different test stages. 
Position Mean Standard error
9 0,67 0,003
50 0,657 0,003
56 0,648 0,003
This section has shown how the WTA is going to be measured and how does it 
varies across countries and time. The fact that WTA declines over time will be exploited in 
our instrumental variable strategy. The next section will explain this and other procedures 
carried out in order to analyze how the differences in WTA may affect social research.
3. Econometric strategy
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate how WTA affects studies which use 
the databases provided by standardized tests. The omission of WTA affects studies with a 
cross-country and individual-level perspective. Due to the different nature of these studies I 
use two different econometric strategies. In this section, I describe both techniques.
2.1. Individual-level perspective
The aim of this part is to analyze how the omission of the individual WTA creates 
biased regressions when the PISA-test score of  students is  the dependent variable.  To 
analyze this fact, I define WTAi as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student counted the 
dots correctly and zero otherwise.
First, I conduct four regressions to analyze the potential bias of omitting WTA. The 
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first  one considers only the PISA outcome and socioeconomic factors.  The second one 
includes  also  psychological  aspects  of  the  students.  The  third  and  fourth  regressions 
replicates the previous regressions (1 and 2) but incorporate WTAi.
These are the regressions expressed mathematically:
 PISAi = α + β1 SEi + ei (1)
PISAi = α + β1 SEi + β2 PSi + ei (2)
PISAi = α + β1 SEi  + β3 WTAi + ei (3)
PISAi = α + β1 SEi + β2 PSi + β3 WTAi + ei (4)
By comparing the vectors  β1, it is possible to measure the existing bias of those 
studies which use standardized tests at an individual-student level.
It can be argued, that there are other substantive variables not included in these 
regressions which could be correlated with both WTAi   and PISAi. Therefore, in order to 
strength  the  validity  of  the  coefficient  β3,  I  conducted  an  instrumental  variable  (IV) 
analysis.
Concretely,  I  exploit  the  fact  that  students  answer  mathematical  questions  in 
different moments during the PISA test. Precisely, different students receive, randomly, 
different  set  of  questions,  called  booklets.  In  some booklets,  students  answer  first  the 
mathematical part of PISA-test and later the reading and science parts. In these cases the 
dot-counting question is at position 9. 
In other booklets, students start with the reading and science exercises and answer 
the mathematical part at the end. In those cases the dot-counting question is at position 
50.  As  we  have  seen  before,  WTA  declines  over  time  meaning  that  those  students 
answering the mathematical questions at the beginning have provided a larger effort in the 
mathematical part than those which answer the mathematical questions later on. This 
difference helps us to avoid a weak instrument. 
The formal econometric technique is the following: First, I create a dummy variable 
(POS) equal to 0 if the mathematical questions were at the beginning (dot-counting in 
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position  9)  and 1  if  these  questions  were  answered  later  in  the  test  (dot-counting  in 
position 50). And I conduct instrumental variables:
PISAi = α + β1 SEi +  β3IV WTAi + ei  (IV 1)
Using POSi as an instrument for WTAi
WTAi = α + β1 SEi + β2 POS i +ui (IV 2)
As we will see, the coefficients of β3IV and β3 are statistically the same and therefore, 
β3 is preferred. Due to this, all the computations related with the instrumental variables 
can be looked up in appendices (Appendix 1).
Regarding the IV, please notice that I have decided not to use the questioner with 
the psychological variables, because students of many countries have not answered them. 
Consequently,  this  increases  the  number  of  observations.  I  have  also  eliminated  the 
observations when the question was in position 56 as many students did not manage to go 
that far in the test. Including these observations could generate a selection bias. In order to 
increase comparability, I have also eliminated this booklet form the OLS regressions.
Finally, we should take into account the possibility of a measurement error problem. 
Precisely, the dot counting exercise in the PISA-test is not a perfect imitation of the Rey 
Dot  Counting  test.  Another  measurement  error  could  be  that  students  might  make 
mistakes in spite of being motivated. The data set provided by PISA does not help us to 
disentangle between these two sources of errors. If any of these factors is present, we would 
obtain a downward estimation of the role of WTA.
2.2 Cross-country perspective
In this paper, I also analyze the effect of omitting the role of WTA in cross-country 
analyses.  Concretely,  PISA-tests  do not consider  that students from different countries 
present different WTA. Therefore, the PISA-tests scores at a country level are measured 
with error and this potentially generates measurement bias.
Please,  notice  that  in  this  part  I  study  data  aggregated  to  a  country  level. 
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Therefore, WTAc is the percentage of students in a given country which counted correctly. 
I will show whether WTA is correlated with the PISA-score at a country level. If 
this is the case we have an non-classical measurement error which is more problematic 
than the traditional measurement error. The regression is conducted as follows.
PISAc = α + β1 WTAc  +  ec  (5)
Later, I will explain in detail the consequences of this problem. For doing so, I will 
suppose that PISA is equal to the true quality of Education (Educc) plus an error term uc
PISAc = Educc  +  uc  (6)
I will construct this error term relying in the theory which claims that PISA tests 
and other standardized tests are a good measurement tool only when students are fully 
motivated and cooperative (Sjøberg 2007; Borghans, Heckman, Lee and ter Weel 2007). 
Educc should consider as motivated all the students of all countries. This is done by giving 
to each country the extra points that every student would get if they where motivated -the 
coefficient β3 from regression (4)- to every non motivated student:
u c=−β3(1−WTAc) (7)
Thanks to the estimation of this measurement error, I will be able to compute the 
bias  produced  when  PISA-test-score  is  used  as  a  dependent  variable  in  cross-country 
regressions. 
Finally, I will compare the differences between Educc and PISAc.
2.3 Further specifications:
In regressions (1) - (4) I use the PISA score as endogenous variable. There, I use the 
student weights provided in the PISA-test database in order to obtain unbiased estimators. 
Finally, I would like to clarify the statistical tools used for the regressions (1)-(4). 
Concretely, PISA-test uses a technique called plausible numbers. Each student does not 
receive one single grade but five different values which have to be taken into account when 
performing an OLS regression. Because of that, I have modified the standard errorrs of the 
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coefficients of the regressions according to the instructions of OECD (2000b).
2.4 Variable description
I have included a number of socioeconomic variables to identify possible influences 
on the PISA-test score and the level of motivation: 
Private school (  priv  ) : The variable  priv is a dummy variable, equal to one if the 
school attended by the student is private.
Economic status index (  eco  ) : PISA index that combines the education of the parents 
and their occupation at the time of the test being held. It is also correlated with time 
preferences of the children and other non-cognitive variables (Heckman 2007).
Number of siblings (  nsib  ) : The number of siblings affects the cognitive and non-
cognitive skills of students as parents must divide their effort in education among a larger 
number of children (among others: Steelman, Powell, Werum and Carter 2002).
Language  spoken  at  home  (  langother  ) :  this  variable  is  equal  to  one  when  the 
language spoken at home is different from the official languages spoken in the country. A 
low command of the language spoken may increase the relative difficulty of the exam for a 
given student, increasing their fatigue and reducing her motivation (Pajares 2007).
Born abroad (  imm  ):   This variable is equal to one if the student is born in another 
country. A student born abroad may not share the culture and the motivation of  her 
colleagues. It may also create special circumstances for the child's learning. (e.g. Bauer,
Lofstrom and Zimmermann 2000).
Female student (  female  ):   Gender factors may affect the motivation of the student. 
Self-concept or interest in mathematics may differ across genders (e.g. Beaton et al., 1996). 
This variable is equal to one for female students.
Country  dummies: I  have  also  included  country  dummies  as  intercepts  of  the 
regression. Due to their number, country dummies are not shown in the tables.
In the next table I present a summary of these variables.
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 TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics (unweighted)
Observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max
eco 32550 43.75 16.78 16 90
nsib 34220 1.86 1.32 0 12
langother 31638 0.05 0.22 0 1
priv 26455 0.19 0.39 0 1
imm 33209 0.07 0.25 0 1
female 34509 0.5 0.5 0 1
Additionally, I have included the description of the psychological variables used in 
the appendices (Appendix 2). 
4. Results
This section presents the final analysis of the effect of WTA in the PISA-test. It is 
divided into two parts. The first one includes the effects of omitting WTA when using 
standardized  tests  at  the  individual-level,  and  the  second  one  addresses  the  effect  of 
omitting WTA when standardized tests are used in a cross-country perspective.
3.1 Results at the individual-level
The first aim of the paper is to measure the consequences of omitting WTA, and to 
measure the role of WTA in the individual PISA-test score. 
The following table shows the coefficients of OLS regressions on PISA-test score 
which include: Only socioeconomic factors (1), socioeconomic and psychological factors (2), 
and the previous models and WTAi (3 and 4). I have also included the first and second 
stages of the instrumental variable in order to compare the coefficient of WTA obtained 
with OLS and the one obtained with IV methods (5 and 6). As I have mentioned before, a 
detailed IV analysis con be found in the appendices (Appendix 1).
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 TABLE 3
Comparison of coefficients when considering WTA or not 
Dependent variable: PISA-score Instrumental variables
1 2 3 4  5 
1st -stage
6
2nd -stage
WTA 73.70 ***
1.58
63.36 ***
1.67
121.44 ***
33.81
eco 1,33***
0.04
1.22 ***
0.04
1.08 ***
0.04
0.94 ***
0.04
 0.003 ***
 0.0002
0.89 ***
0.12
nsib -7.65 ***
0.58
-6.80 ***
0.59
-6.08 ***
0.052
-5.62 ***
0.54
 -0.02***
 0.003
-5.01 ***
0.84
langother -36.18 ***
3.94
-39.07 ***
4.27
-34.61 ***
3.61
-36.21 ***
3.99
 -0.037 *
 0.021
-33.87 ***
3.74
priv 18.44 ***
2.28 
13.08 ***
2.27 
13.65 ***
2.12
9.71***
2.14
 0.07 ***
 0.01
10.71 ***
3.16 
imm -21.87 ***
3.03
-19.10 ***
3.15
-17.68 ***
2.76
-16.41 ***
2.90
 -0.06 ***
 0.016
-14.02 ***
3.30
female 12.80 ***
1.33
7.59 ***
1.29
13.76 ***
1.23
9.60 ***
1.32
 -0.01
 0.007
14.34 ***
1.23
POS  -0.03***
 0.007
constant 427.72 ***
6.72 
478.86 ***
7.11 
397.49 ***
3.18
433.82 ***
5.95
 0.59***
 0.03
370.58 ***
3.74
Psycho. 
variables?
NO YES NO YES  NO NO
Number obs 18667 16071 18667 16071 18667 18667
R2 0.36 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.11 0.42
Note: 1,2,3,4 Entries are plausible numbers coefficients with adjusted standard deviations below. R2 for OLS 
regression. IV Entries are the coefficients for the IV strategy with robust standard deviations below. *** p< .
01; ** p < .05; * p <0.1. for two-tailed tests. 
The first  observation is that WTA is significant in both models (OLS and IV). 
However a Hausman test indicates our preference for OLS models:
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TABLE 4
Hausman test for endogenous regressors.
Endogeneity test of
endogenous regressors l2.16
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.14
 
In  general,  the  inclusion  of  WTA produces  an  increase  in  R2.  Concretely,  the 
increase of variance explained from models 1 and 2 to models 3 and 4 is 12% and 8% 
respectively.  However,  as  I  have  mentioned  before,  this  value  can  be  a  downward 
estimation bias of the real impact of WTA. This is the first result of the paper:
Result 1: The willingness to answer accounts for at least for 8% to 12% of the total 
variance  of the PISA-test score.
As  we  can  observe  in  column  5,  many  of  the  variables  usually  considered  in 
individual-level  studies  are  correlated  with  WTA.  This  creates  an  omitted-variable 
problem. If we exclude WTA from our regressions, the coefficients of the socioeconomic 
variables change significantly. However, these changes vary from one variable to another. 
The next table summarizes these changes.
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TABLE 5
Percent change of the effect of socio-economic variables after using WTA 
Variation  without 
psycho. variables 
Variation  with 
psycho. variables 
eco -23.1% -29.8%
nsib -25.8% -21.0%
langother -4.5% -7.9%
priv -35.1% -34.7%
imm -23.7% -16.4%
female 7.0% 20.9%
From a statistical perspective, whether the school is public or private is the variable 
which experiences the largest variation. The influence of the private schooling in PISA-test 
score declines if the WTA is considered. The effect of private schooling on learning is a hot 
topic in education and labor studies (e.g. Vandenberghe, 2003; Dronkers, 2008). Further 
research on the topic should take the fact into account that students coming from private 
schools present significantly higher WTA. 
Additionally, the differences in gender should be mentioned. Sulkunen (2007) claims 
on this topic that PISA-test items are more interesting for girls that for boys (Sulkunen 
2007). Moreover, if standardized tests are seen as a contribution to a public good (see 
appendix 3), we should take into account that female students are usually more willing to 
cooperate on such circumstances (e.g. Cadsby and Maynes 1998). Sulkunen (2007) suggests 
that these problems, which are reflected also in our results, could be removed by changing 
the items.
Finally,  we  cannot  exclude  that  other  individual  or  school  characteristics  are 
affected by the omission of WTA. This could generate important research problems.
Together, all these effects represent the second main result of this paper.
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Result 2: Results from PISA-tests studies which omit WTA are likely to be biased 
due to the correlations between different socioeconomic variables and the WTA.
3.2. Cross-country perspective
So far I have analyzed the consequences of using these tests at an individual-level. 
Now I analyze the problems which arise when researchers use those tests at a cross-country 
level, with aggregated data.
First, I analyze whether the source of measurement error, WTA, is correlated with 
the PISA-score at a country level.
TABLE 6 
Regression of PISAc test on WTAc
Dependent variable: PISA
1
WTAc 225.89 ***
(33.93)
Constant 329.46***
(22.33)
R2 0.65
Number of Obs 32
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with t-values in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests. 
The previous table shows the strong correlation between willingness to answer and 
the PISA-test score.  This provokes a non-classical measurement error (Fuller 1987). In 
theory, non-classical measurement error can lead to an attenuation bias and it can even 
reverse the sign of the effect of PISA if the measurement error is large (Fuller 1987). This 
is the third result of the paper:
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Result 3. The existence of measurement error problem creates an attenuation bias 
when the standardized tests scores are used in a cross-country analysis. 
It is possible to measure the level of attenuation biased produced when WTA is 
omitted. Let's suppose that we want to analyze the impact of education quality (x) on a 
given variable y :
 y = βx + e (8)
But, we only have data on:
z = x + u (9)
Where z is the PISA-test score. Therefore, if E(u) = 0 and σ2xu ≠ 0, then the OLS-
estimator for β:
β̂=
cov (x+u ,βx+e )
var (x+u)
(10)
so that we have in this case:
plim β̂=
β(σx
2+σxu)
σ x
2+σu
2+2σxu
=(1−b uz )β (11)
where buz is the regression coefficient of a regression of u on z (Fuller 1987). In our 
case,  z is the PISA-test score and I have estimated  u  according to (7). Therefore, I can 
calculate buz :
TABLE 7 
Regression of uc on PISAc test
Dependent variable: uc
1
PISAc 0.16 ***
(0.02)
Constant -78.41***
(10.44)
R2 0.66
Number of Obs 32
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with t-values in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests. 
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According to this regression, we might conclude that the attenuation bias is around 
16% when we use PISA-test score as a measurement of education quality.
Before presenting the conclusions, I include the new index (EDUC) showing the 
position of the countries if WTA is considered. I normalize PISA and EDUC by giving the 
value of 1 to the country with the largest score. I also include how many positions a given 
country gains or looses with the new index.
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 TABLE   8
Comparison PISA and EDUC
From the previous table, we can observe two main consequences of considering 
WTA. First, there are several changes in the relative position of countries. Great Britain 
and the Netherlands would be the countries which would lose the most positions if WTA is 
taken into account, and Czech Republic the country which would gain the most. The 
second consequence is that the differences in the educative systems across countries 
diminish. The quality of educational systems seems to be much more similar when WTA is 
considered. 
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PISA EDUC Variation
HKG 1 HKG 1 0
JPN 0,99 JPN 0,99 0
KOR 0,98 KOR 0,98 0
NZL 0,96 FIN 0,98 +1
FIN 0,96 CZE 0,97 +3
AUS 0,95 CAN 0,96 +1
CAN 0,95 NZL 0,96 -3
CZE 0,94 AUS 0,96 -2
GBR 0,94 FRA 0,96 +2
BEL 0,93 AUT 0,95 +2
FRA 0,92 BEL 0,95 -1
AUT 0,92 GBR 0,95 -4
DNK 0,92 ISL 0,95 +1
ISL 0,92 SWE 0,93 +1
SWE 0,91 NOR 0,93 +2
IRL 0,9 DNK 0,93 -3
NOR 0,89 CHE 0,91 +1
CHE 0,89 USA 0,9 +1
USA 0,88 IRL 0,9 -3
DEU 0,88 DEU 0,9 0
HUN 0,87 HUN 0,9 0
RUS 0,85 POL 0,88 +2
ESP 0,85 ESP 0,88 0
POL 0,84 RUS 0,88 -2
LVA 0,83 LVA 0,87 0
NLD 0,82 ITA 0,86 +1
ITA 0,82 PRT 0,86 +1
PRT 0,81 GRC 0,85 +1
GRC 0,8 LUX 0,84 +1
LUX 0,8 NLD 0,83 -4
MEX 0,69 MEX 0,74 0
BRA 0,6 BRA 0,67 0
5. Conclusions
In this paper I have shown how some students may not be fully motivated during 
standardized  tests.  I  have  analyzed  this  problem in  depth,  and  I  identify  three  main 
results:
 The willingness to answer of students accounts for the 8% - 12% of the PISA-test 
variation.
 Results obtained from using the PISA-test databases at the individual level are 
likely to be biased if WTA is omitted.
 Researches  which  consider  the  PISA-test  databases  at  an  a  cross-country 
perspective face a non-classical measurement if WTA is omitted.
Previous  researches  on  education  have  used  standardized  tests  assuming  full 
cooperation by the subjects. Therefore, we must be concerned with the validity of their 
results, their conclusions and the proposals which emanate from their results.
I am aware of the differences between a pure motivation test, concretely the Dot-
Counting test, and the item M136Q01T from the PISA test. The results presented in this 
paper do need to be taken with care but may still be used as a starting point for a better  
use and design of standardized tests. For instance, it would be important to notice that 
links between the socioeconomic variables and WTA are likely to vary across countries. For 
instance, “Do girls and boys have a more similar WTA in Sweden than in Brazil?”, “How 
do migrants from different countries approach these tests?”, etc.
In general,  the problems previously mentioned and the limitations of this paper 
could  be  avoided  by  introducing  questions  able  to  measure  adequately  the  WTA of 
students at different stages of standardized tests. Whether the used technique is the Dot-
Counting task or any other is a decision which must be made by expert psychologists. 
However it is a relative cheap and easy to implement measure which could improve the 
quality and exactness of social research
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APPENDIX 1
IV Estimation
First-stage regression of WTA:
OLS estimation
--------------
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity
N of obs =    18667
Centered R2 =   0.1131
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
         WTA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         eco |   .0033586   .0002229    15.07   0.000     .0029217    .0037956
        priv |   .0719288   .0127195     5.66   0.000     .0469975    .0968601
         imm |  -.0564526   .0164705    -3.43   0.001    -.0887363   -.0241688
      female |  -.0118252   .0072962    -1.62   0.105    -.0261265    .0024761
        nsib |  -.0206573   .0029154    -7.09   0.000    -.0263717   -.0149428
   langother |  -.0367269   .0208317    -1.76   0.078    -.0775589    .0041052
         POS |  -.0329383   .0069024    -4.77   0.000    -.0464677   -.0194089
       _cons |   .5936111   .0339139    17.50   0.000     .5271368    .6600855
Summary results for first-stage regressions
-------------------------------------------
                                           (Underid)            (Weak id)
Variable     | F(  1, 18639)  P-val | AP Chi-sq(  1) P-val | AP F(  1, 18639)
WTA          |      22.77    0.0000 |       22.81   0.0000 |       22.77
IV (2SLS) estimation
--------------------
Number of obs =    18667
Centered R2   =   0.4372
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
        PISA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         WTA |   121.4422   33.81033     3.59   0.000     55.17519    187.7093
         eco |   .8999753   .1185693     7.59   0.000     .6675837    1.132367
        priv |   10.70744   3.162769     3.39   0.001      4.50853    16.90636
         imm |  -14.02616   3.296453    -4.25   0.000    -20.48709   -7.565229
      female |   14.34301   1.238203    11.58   0.000     11.91617    16.76984
        nsib |    -5.0104   .8370494    -5.99   0.000    -6.650987   -3.369814
   langother |  -33.87006   3.741478    -9.05   0.000    -41.20323    -26.5369
       _cons |   370.5845   20.15628    18.39   0.000     331.0789    410.0901
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               2.165
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1412
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APPENDIX 2
Psychological variables
General self-efficacy (GSE): PISA test, in its 2000 version, includes a measurement 
of a general self-efficacy.
Mathematics  self-efficacy  (MSE)  : This  variable  is  derived  from  the  level  of 
agreement  with  the  following  statements:  “I  get  good  marks  in  mathematics”; 
“Mathematics is one of my best subjects”, and “I have always done well in mathematics”.
Task value (TV): The CCC questioner has a index of interest in mathematics.
Mastery approach (MA): This variable is derived from the answer to the question, 
“I try to do my best to acquire the knowledge and skills taught”.
Performance approach (PA): I used the index of competitive learning presented in 
the PISA databases.
Time preferences (TP):  In order to analyze  time preference and far-sightedness   I 
use the  levels of agreement with the statement: “I study in order to get a good job”.
Self-regulation (SR):  The data provided by PISA includes a self-regulation index.
TABLE A1
Description of physiological and socioeconomic variables
Variable     Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
---+-----------------------------------------------------------
     GSE    35760   -.0191046    .9883728       -2.9       2.28
     MSE    35109    .0000313    1.000667      -1.62       1.74
      TV    35384    .0601063    1.009611      -1.93       2.27
      MA    35228    2.779976    .8038993          1          4
      PA    35371    .0437519    .9968005      -2.58       2.21
      TP    35077    2.977792     .813518          1          4
      SR    35726    .0093444    .9878579      -3.38       2.00
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APPENDIX 3
The following table  shows how different  variables  can determine whether  students  are 
WTA at the country level.
TABLE A3
Regression of the % of collaborative students (WTA) and selected cultural variables.
Dependent variable: WTA
I II III IV
PISA 0,0026 ***
(9.50)
0,0025 ***
(8.21)
0,0023***
(3,63)
0,0023***
(8,21)
GDP per Capita 2000 3.66
(0.24)
6,81
(0,82)
3,95
(0,28)
Expenditures in 
Education 2000
-5,89
(-0,58)
Children unselfish 0,28***
(3,64)
Constant -0,62***
(-4,58)
-0,62***
(-4,33)
-0,53*
(-1,95)
-0,59***
(-4,70)
R2 0,66 0,66 0,53 0,69
Number of Obs 30 30 23 30
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with t-values in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests. 
Here, PISA is the Pisa-test score of the country, GDP per Capita 2000 Expenditures  
in Education are  expressed  in  millions  of  dollars,  and  Children unselfish refers  to  the 
percentage of people that choose “unselfishness” as a main quality that children must learn 
at home, according to the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2000) .
We can see how the variable  Children unselfish is significant. This shows how the 
effort contribution to the test can be understood as as public good experiment, where 
students loose  some utility  by exerting effort  to  help  the “advance of  science” or  the 
researchers.
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Stories on Corruption:
How Media and Prosecutors Influence Elections. 
Abstract:
I analyse whether Attorney Generals try to influence elections by adjusting the tempo of 
their investigations to the electoral calendar, and whether mass media have a partisan bias 
and hide corruption activities of their preferred parties. For doing so, I have coded the 
number of articles containing the word “corruption” of the two main Spanish newspapers, 
finding significant evidence of both behaviours.
Key words: Mass media, prosecutor , political economy, corruption, newspaper, Spain
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1. Introduction
Prosecutors are the legal party responsible for presenting and directing the criminal 
cases in countries ruled by inquisitorial or adversarial law systems. Although their position 
may  be  obtained  by  public  contest,  their  chief,  the  Attorney  General  (AG),  is  often 
appointed by the party in government.
In  many  countries,  e.g.  USA  or  Spain,  the  political  independence  of  Attorney 
Generals  is  questioned  by  opposition  parties.  This  notion  is  supported  by  different 
empirical studies (Gordon, S. 2009 or Alt, J. and Lassen, D. 2010) which seem to indicate 
that American prosecutors have shown signs of partisan bias.
Furthermore, there is a growing literature about the existence of media bias. See, for 
instance, Groseclose, T. and Milyo, F. (2005), or for a more comprehensive view D'alessio, 
D. and Allen, M. (2000). Such media, e.g. newspapers, are often used by citizens to gather 
the information required for making their political decisions. Hence, it is not surprising 
that, among others, Della Vigna S. and Kaplan E.( 2007), Gerber, A., et al. (2006) and 
Lim, C. et al. (2010) have found that media can influence political outcomes. 
In this paper I will try to show whether both political actors, i.e. mass media and 
the AG., manoeuvre in order to influence elections: 
Firstly, attorneys could adjust the tempo of their investigations on corruption to the 
electoral calendar by accelerating or slowing them down. . 
Secondly, mass media, as explained by Besley, T. and Prat, A. (2006), may decide 
not to publish corruption news about cases or trials investigated by the AG.'s office when 
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this would negatively affect their preferred political party.
This  is  the  first  paper,  to  my  knowledge,  that  will  consider  both  actors 
simultaneously. Another contribution of this paper will be the study of a young democracy, 
namely Spain.
I have structured this paper as follows: In section 2 I show the empirical strategy; 
then in section 3 I explain the econometric technique used. In section 4 I present the 
results, and at the end I discuss their political meaning and their econometric validity.
2. Empirical strategy
The general idea of the empirical model is the following: If a given party A governs 
a given region X then only A can extract rents in X. If there are elections in X, the AG., 
appointed by party B, can speed up or slow down the investigations in X in order to 
present the case to the media at a time when most of the citizens are deciding on their 
vote, which is usually around four weeks before elections take place (CIS, 2008). Then the 
mass media must decide whether to publish those reports or not. If  a media group is 
biased towards A, then it can decide to hide those cases from its readers. On the contrary, 
a  newspaper  with  a  bias  towards  B will  publish  those  stories,  thereby increasing  the 
number of news about corruption before the elections when A is the incumbent.
The AG. can also postpone the investigations on corruption of its preferred party 
(B) just before the elections when B is the incumbent. If that is the case, both newspapers 
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will  show a  significant  decrease  in  the  publication  of  articles  about  corruption  before 
elections.
To  find  statistical  evidence  of  this  theory  I  will  examine  the  quantitative 
relationship  between  stories  on  corruption  published  by  two  ideologically-opposed 
newspapers  and  the  proximity  to  elections.  This  relationship  will  crucially  depend  on 
whether incumbent party has appointed the AG. or not.
As the ideology of the AG. and the political preferences of media groups are both 
important,  I  will  run  four  different  regressions:  One  regression  for  each  of  the  two 
newspapers analysed and for each of the last  two AG.s in office. This will help us to 
disentangle the possible partisan bias of the different actors.
3. Econometric technique
The two newspapers analysed are those with the largest number of readers, “El 
País” with a Social Democrat ideology and “El Mundo”, that is conservative.
I have created the endogenous variables by counting how many articles with the 
word “corruption” were weekly published  in these newspapers from January 1999 to May 
2011. I used searches in Google for the case of “El Mundo” and the internal search engine 
of “El Pais”. The definitive database was made during June 2011.
The use of the word “corruption” can be seen as controversial in some cultures. To 
qualify a  person as “corrupt” or  to judge some actions as  “corrupt activities” can be 
unusual  in  some  countries.  In  Spain  it  is  not  the  case.  Newspapers  use  the  word 
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“corruption” often and mainly to reflect political rent extraction. 
The endogenous variable is therefore a count-variable and it requires the use of a 
Poisson-like function. Concretely, I utilized a heterogeneous negative binomial regression 
that allows for the control of the over-dispersion and the heteroskedasticity existing in the 
data  (Cameron,  A.C.  and  Trivedi,  P.K.  1998).  The  dispersion  parameters  are  the 
endogenous variable, a year indicator variable and a constant term.
In order to control for over-dispersion a heterogeneous negative binomial regression 
modifies the coefficients of a Poisson distribution function. Notably, the coefficients of a 
Poisson distribution satisfy:
(1)
Where:
t is the week indicator
a indicates the first week of study for given Atorney General. 1 for Mr. Cardenal 
and 276 for Mr. Gómez
A is the last week of study for given Atorney General. 275 for Mr. Cardenal and 644 
for Mr. Gómez
n reffers the newspaper: “El País” or “El mundo”
y represents the number of articles about corruption published
x is the vector of political and temporal variables
β is the vector of parameters
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The Xs represent the exogenous variables that in this case I have divided into two 
groups, temporal and political: 
For the temporal  exogenous  variables,  I  have  considered lagged variables  of  the 
number of stories about corruption published, a dummy variable for the weeks belonging to 
August, and due to the increase of corruption in Spain in the last years (Villoria, M. et al. 
2011), I have also included a yearly indicator variable. The coefficients of these variables 
are not presented in the result tables.
The political variables are the variables of interest. There are three of them, one for 
each main political party: “Partido Socialista Obrero Español” (PSOE), social democratic, 
“Partido Popular” (PP), conservative, and another one (OTHERS) that groups the smaller 
parties that have governed only at a regional level.
A given political variable, e.g. PSOE, will be equal to the number of seats at stake 
four weeks prior to an election if PSOE is the incumbent, and zero otherwise. In case of 
several elections occurring at the same time, seats are added. Due to the ambiguity that 
could arise in the European elections, I did not consider any of them. 
For instance imagine that in the week 245 of the study there are elections in Galicia 
(a Spanish region). If Galicia is governed by PSOE, then the variable  PSOE would be 
equal to the number of seats in the Galician parliament during the weeks 242, 243, 244, 
245 and the variables PP and OTHERS would be equal to zero during those weeks.
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4. Results
The first table shows the results of the regressions for the two newspapers when the 
AG. was José Cardenal,  appointed by the conservative party. The next one shows the 
coefficients for the period when Cándido Gómez , appointed by PSOE, was in office.
TABLE 1. 
Results with conservative AG.
Conservative AG.
El País El Mundo
PP 0,0012
(0,53)
0,0039
(0,37)
PSOE -0,0011
(-0,12)
-0,016
(-0,37)
OTHERS -0,0013
(-0,90)
-0,0013
(-0,06)
Dispersion parameters, 
significant at 5%?
Yes No
N. Obs. 272 272
Pseudo R2 0,08 0,2
Note: Entries are heterogeneous negative binomial coefficients with t-values in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests. 
57/113
TABLE 2. 
Results with social democratic AG.
Social democratic AG.
El País El Mundo
PP 0,0029
(3,39) ***
0,0011
(0,94)
PSOE -0,0013
(-2,01)**
-0,0022
(-1,99) **
OTHERS -0,0056
(-2,34)**
0,0035
(1,07)
Dispersion parameters
Significant at 5%?
Yes Yes
N. Obs. 369 369
Pseudo R2 0,09 0,09
Note: Entries are heterogeneous negative binomial coefficients with t-values in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests. 
As we can see in Table 1 there is no significant correlation between the political 
variables for the first set of regressions. 
If we observe Table 2 we see that once the AG. was appointed by the PSOE, there 
is a significant change in the results. PP suffers a highly significant increase of news in “El 
Pais” when this party is the incumbent, and PSOE and OTHERS a significant decrease. If 
we  compare  it  with  “El  Mundo”,  the  conservative  newspaper,  we  see  how  PP and 
OTHERS' variables become insignificant. The coefficient for PSOE in “El Mundo” is not 
significantly different from the coefficient of “El Pais” for the same party. These are the 
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results predicted for a conservative biased media and a biased AG..
From a quantitative perspective and with a given election for a Parliament with 100 
seats at stake, “El País” would write 30% more articles about corruption if PP is the 
incumbent, and 10,8% less if PSOE is the incumbent, once calculated the average marginal 
effect for both variables as explained by Hilbe, J.M. 2007
The dispersion parameters are significant for all the regressions but for the case of 
“El Mundo” in Table 1. Consequently, we know that in case of excluding them we would 
face over-dispersion problems and the t-values would not be valid.
5. Discussion
From the results presented in Table 1 we cannot say that the conservative AG. did 
not have a partisan bias. Before the arrival to power of PP, the previous social democratic 
government  created  a  special  prosecution  office  for  corruption  cases.  His  head,  Carlos 
Jiménez Villarejo, was appointed by the PSOE. He was finally dismissed by the PP in 
2003.  This  duality  could  have  eliminated  a  potential  partisan  bias  when  investigating 
corruption. The lack of significant coefficients can also be explained due to the bad quality 
of the data as the digital versions of both newspapers had just been launched. 
The results of Table 2 are in line with the theoretical prediction: First, with a social 
democratic AG. the social democratic party is likely to face less news about corruption 
when it is the incumbent. Second, when the conservatives are the incumbent more news 
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about corruption may be published in the social democrat media groups but not in the 
conservative ones.
The explanation of  the  coefficient  of  the variable  OTHERS is  more  difficult  to 
explain.  It  has  a  negative  coefficient  for  “El  Pais”  in  the  second  period  but  a  non-
significant in the case of “El Mundo”. It can be the case that “El Pais” publishes less news 
about other parties in the second period of study due to the support that those parties 
brought to PSOE during several years. In any case, their situation is still unclear mainly 
due to the fact that these parties act as hinge parties. 
Before coming to the conclusions, and in an attempt to strengthen the validity of 
these results, I explain some other measures taken:
It could be argued that there is  a double causality problem: a large amount of 
articles about corruption could lead to anticipated elections. In the period studied, only in 
two occasions there were anticipated elections, and none of them were anticipated because 
of corruption:
The first case is the election of October 2003. In the region of Madrid after the 
election of May 2003, none of the parties was able to obtain a majority in the regional 
parliament and new elections were convoked three months later.  The second case is the 
regional election in Catalonia of November 2006. Catalonia after a long negotiation process 
had a new “Estatuto de Autonomía”. This is the main law of the region only preceded by 
the  Constitution.  The  approval  of  the  Estatuto  broke  up  the  coalition  that  governed 
Catalonia and new elections took place. 
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During the time of  study the amount of  articles  published online has increased 
manifold. Thus, I have adjusted the data to control for this fact:
“El  País”and  “El  Mundo”  changed  during  these  ten  years.  To  account  for  the 
successive increase of  importance of  their  digital  edition I counted how many times a 
neutral set of words [ Tarde, Sombra, Partido, Mañana, Cien, Navidad, Semana, Día] was 
written each year in the newspaper and I divided the endogenous variables for the average 
of the use of that set of words.  
It  is  also  possible  to  argue  that  the  national  sections  increase  their  number  of 
articles before an election in order to better inform their readers. This would, exogenously, 
increase the chances of the word corruption to appear in newspaper articles. I also took 
this into consideration: 
I made more than one hundred week-observations to count the number of articles 
for both “El País” and “El Mundo” during and outside the electoral campaign in their 
national  sections.  I  excluded,  for  obvious reasons,  the weeks of  the terrorist  attack of 
March the 11th (occurred in electoral campaign). “El País” writes 1.56 times more articles 
in the national section in electoral campaign and “El Mundo” writes 1.5 times more. The 
endogenous variables have been dividing accordingly 
It could be argued that the different levels of diffusion of the newspapers in the 
different regions can change their behaviour across elections which could lead to omitted-
variable bias problems. This has also been studied and it is not the case here:
I have created a variable for each newspaper equal to the percentage of people who 
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use that newspaper for getting informed about politics (according to CIS 2010) in each 
region when the region faces elections. For instance in the previous example of Galicia, the 
value for diffusion of the regression of “El Pais” is equal to 0,037 for the weeks 242, 243, 
244 and 245. For “El Mundo” it would be 0,013. Both variables came to be insignificant 
when adding them to their respective regressions.
Finally, some people may consider that the AG can increase the investigations of the 
former office-holder. From a theoretical perspective, there are few papers analysing this 
interesting possibility (eg. Bruno (2002)). Probably the main reason is that voters have a 
short memory. This fact is called “voter's myopia” and probably the first good research on 
the field was carried out by Hibbs (1982). In general, most of researches are not able to 
find any effect of a given event in voters' behaviour for a period longer than one year 
(Rowley and Schneider 2008). If the AG decides to increase the investigations of former 
office-holders, she hardly would be able to post-pone those investigations enough years to 
modify the voter's behaviour. That is the reason why I have not considered this possibility 
in the paper.
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6. Conclusions
The main results of this paper are: 
1) Since the appointment of  Cándido Gómez as Spanish Attorney General it 
seems that there has been a significant political use of the public prosecution.
2)  The newspaper “El Mundo” shows, in principle, a partisan bias by hiding 
corruption reports on conservative politicians.
Therefore,  in  order  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  Spanish  Democratic  system, 
political measures should be taken to avoid partisan behaviour of Attorney Generals.
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Responding to the Climate Change Challenge:
Experimental Evidence 
Abstract
In  the  literature  on  common-pool  resources,  environmental  uncertainty  is  often 
ignored.  In  this  paper,  we  report  results  from a  laboratory  experiment  exploring  the 
impact of resource uncertainty on individual harvests in common-pool resource dilemmas. 
The uncertainty is modelled as a weather shock diminishing resources, which is drawn from 
the distribution known in advance to participants. We find that sufficiently severe weather 
shocks can induce individuals to conserve resources. In addition, our results suggest that 
resource  uncertainty  undermines  effectiveness  of  costly  sanctioning.  The  possibility  to 
punish others induce individuals to harvest significantly more resources in the beginning of 
the experiment, compared to the situation when sanctioning is not possible. The presence 
of punishment paradoxically increases the probability of resource exhaustion. 
Key words: climate change, common pool resources, experimental economics, environmental shocks 
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1. Introduction
In common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas, individuals jointly harvest from a common-
pool resources such as water, forest or fishery. The CPR dilemmas entail a conflict between 
the short-term interests of individuals and long-term welfare of a group. Harvesting less 
today gives resources the time to renew itself, allowing everyone in the group to harvest 
more  in  the  future.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  majority  of  individuals  fail  to  conserve 
resources, future resource growth and expected payoffs can be substantially diminished, 
causing in extreme cases resource exhaustion. Brand et al. (2012) show that unsustainable 
harvests  may  lead  to  a  downward  spiral  of  increasing  exploitation  and  disappointing 
returns.   
The  CPR  dilemmas  have  been  investigated  extensively  both  theoretically  and 
experimentally. So far, the effect of uncertainty in CPR is still not adequately understood. 
This relates to the fact that even in the absence of stochastic factors, feedback between 
behavior and resource growth induce non-linear dynamics difficult to study analytically 
(Antoniadou  et  al.,  2013).  Yet,  many  CPR  dilemmas  that  occur  in  practice  are 
characterized  by  environmental  uncertainty  over  resource  dynamics  (Suleiman  and 
Rapoport, 1988). So far, the impact of uncertainty on harvesting strategies is ambiguous. 
It has been shown that uncertainty may encourage more selfish behavior (Budescu et al., 
1992, 1995; Rapoport et al. 1992; 1993), but it can also encourage resource conservation 
(Aflaki, 2010; Safarzynska, 2013), depending on how uncertainty and resource dynamics 
are  modeled.  Moreover,  the  impact  of  uncertainty  in  common-pool  resources  on  the 
coevolution  of  harvesting  strategies  and  institutions  has  been  overlooked  so  far.  Our 
research aims to fill in this gap.
In this paper, we report results from a laboratory experiment exploring the impact 
of  resource  uncertainty  on  individual  harvests  in  common-pool  resource  dilemmas.  In 
particular,  we  study  whether  random  shocks,  which  diminish  resources,  can  induce 
individuals  to  conserve  resources.  In  addition,  we  examine  how weather  shocks  affect 
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harvesting strategies in the presence of punishing. It has been shown in an important class 
of experiments that overharvesting can be prevented in the presence of costly sanctioning 
(Ostrom et al., 1992, 1994, Ostrom, 2006). However, there are concerns that the inclusion 
of temporal and spatial dynamics may undermine effectiveness of costly punishment, unless 
combined with communication (Janssen et al., 2011). We find that in the long run, weather 
shocks  can  encourage  resource  conservation.  Surprisingly,  the  possibility  of  punishing 
others   -   given  the  same  intensity  and  severity  of  weather  shocks  -  increases  the 
probability of resource exhaustion. This can be explained by the fact that introducing the 
possibility to punish others significantly increases total harvests in the first period of the 
experiment, compared to the situation when individuals cannot punish others. 
Our approach is motivated by the fact that the intensity and severity of natural 
disasters is expected to increase in the forthcoming years due to climate change (IPCC, 
2007). In this context,  weather shocks can be interpreted as natural disasters, such as 
flooding or droughts. Already, many of the major renewable resources like water, fisheries, 
and forests are under threat or in a state of decline (Clark, 1973; Copeland and Taylor, 
2009). There are concerns that climate change will further escalate their scarcity (Homer-
Dixon  et  al.,  1993).  For  instance,  overexploitation,  often  combined  with  habitat 
destruction, threatens one-third of the endangered species (Lande et al., 1994). Notably, 
resource exhaustion is not an inevitable result of environmental degradation or climate 
change. Climate variability can trigger adaptive responses and societal resilience, increasing 
opportunities for learning, innovation and institutional change (Ostrom, 2006). Yet, studies 
of the impact of uncertainty on institutional arrangements in common pool dilemmas are 
scarce (e.g., Kimbrough and Wilson, 2013).
In the proposed experiment, subjects decide how much resources to harvest from the 
common-pool  resources.  Resources  are renewable  and re-grow according to the logistic 
curve. Individual payoffs are determined by accumulated profits over the entire experiment. 
This encourages individuals to overharvest resources. However, subjects are also aware that 
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they will not receive any reimbursements in case resources are exhausted. They are not 
informed about the length of experiment, which encourages them to conserve resources. In 
this context, we explore the trade-off between short- and long-term incentives. Harvesting 
more today yields immediate higher profits, but it simultaneously replenishes resources, 
diminishing  their  re-growth and increasing  the  probability  of  resource  exhaustion.  We 
examine conditions (institutional arrangements) under which group benefits can overweight 
individual incentives, and how uncertainty over resources affects harvesting strategies. In 
particular, in our experiment, a random event, i.e. weather shocks diminishing resources, 
occurs with the probability known in advance to the participants. The shock increases the 
probability of resource exhaustion especially in groups, which resources are close to their 
ecological limits.
Our approach relates to the theoretical and experimental literature on the effect of 
environmental  uncertainty  on  the  equilibrium  outcomes  of  the  common  pool  resource 
games (Budescu et al., 1992; Rapoport et al. 1992; 1993, Biel and Grling, 1995; Aflaki, 
2010; Antoniadou et al., 2013; Kimbrough and Wilson, 2013). The evidence from many 
theoretical models suggests that environmental uncertainty is likely to lead to more selfish 
behavior. Results from our experiments show the contrary evidence. The difference can be 
explained by the discrepancies in how environmental uncertainty has been modeled in the 
previous work and in our experiment. In work by Rapoport and co-authors, individuals 
decide how much to harvest, when the exact size of resources is unknown. Resources are 
sampled from a commonly known probability distribution. Individuals receive requested 
harvest only if the total group request is smaller than realized resources. The authors show 
that if the risk associated with the resource size is high, increased risk about the resource 
size leads to more consumption. In this approach, harvesting in the current period does not 
affect future harvests. On the other hand, in our model, harvesting today increases the 
chances of survival also in the future, and thus future payoffs, which is a source of a trade-
off between current and future payoffs. In another experiment by Kimbrough and Wilson 
70/113
(2013),  environmental  shocks  are  conceptualized  as  a  decrease  in  the  productivity 
parameter, which governs the maximum growth of resources within a patch (resources are 
spatially distributed). Here, subjects move an avatar on the screen, collecting resources 
from different  patches.  Changes  in  productivity  are  unknown to  participants  till  they 
occur. In this paper, weather shocks are random events, which diminishes resources. The 
probability  distribution  from which  the  shock  is  drawn  and  the  probability  of  shock 
occurring is  known to individuals.  This  allows us to study how the trade-off  between 
current and future payoffs is affected by resource uncertainty. 
Our paper also relates to the literature on the governance of commons (Dietz et al., 
2003). In his influential article, Hardin (1968) argues that overharvesting of a CPR cannot 
be  prevented  unless  an  external  authority  imposes  sanctions  on  over-harvesters. 
Subsequently, results from many field research has shown that many communities self-
organize  and  design  effective  institutions  to  prevent  resource  exhaustion  even  in  the 
absence of external interventions (Ostrom et al., 1992). In particular, it has been shown 
that participants were willing to pay a fee in order to fine another participant. However, 
there are concerns that punishment can cause welfare loss (Gachter and Hermann, 2011). 
In addition, Janssen et al.,  (2011) show that costly punishments may have no positive 
effect  on  resource  harvesting  unless  combined  with  communication.  In  this  paper,  we 
explore how environmental uncertainty affects the effectiveness of punishment in CPR. We 
find that punishment can be perceived as additional risk factor of loss of future payoffs, 
causing individuals to overharvest resources. 
The reminder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a formal model of 
common pool resources and discuss theoretial predictions. In Section 3, we describe the 
experimental setting. Section 4 summarizes our findings, followed by conclusions in Section 
5. 
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2. The theoretical setting 
In each group  j,  n individuals  i decide simultaneously on how much resources to 
harvest from the common pool resources Rj. Individuals are allowed to harvest up to
 jtijt Rnx 1< , where xij is a harvest by individual i in a group j. The duration of the game is 
determined by collective decisions and the stochastic weather shocks. The game ends if 
resources become exhausted, in our case if  Rjt < 1. If individuals conserve resources, the 
game can be played for infinite time periods. In the actual experiment, individuals has not 
been informed about the length of the experiment to approximate this condition.
Total  harvests  Yj is  defined  as a  sum of  harvests  by  n  individuals  in  group  j: 
jt
i
ijtjt RxY ≤= ∑ . 
Resource dynamics follow the logistic curve:
jt
jt
jtjtjt YK
R
rRRR −−+=+ )(11 (1)
where  r is  the intrinsic growth rate of  the resource,  K is  the carrying capacity, 
)/( KRrR jtjt −1 captures the natural growth or regeneration of resources.
With  probability p,  weather  shock θj diminishes  resources.  The shock  is  drawn 
randomly  from  the  uniform  distribution  U( , ).α β  If  a  group  runs  out  of  resource, 
individuals lose all their payoffs. We consider only negative weather shocks, which diminish 
resources.  This is  because of the fact that in the presence of positive events,  resource 
conservation is not necessary to prevent group collapse.
In the absence of weather shocks, the sustainable level of harvests which prevents 
group collapse  requires  that  the total  harvest  does not  exceed  the intrinsic  growth of 
resources:  
j
j
j
jjt YK
R
rRR =−= )(1  (2).
Point A in Figure 1, which lies at the intersection of the intrinsic growth curve jtR  
and the total harvest curve jtY , satisfies the condition given by equation 2. The weather 
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shock  θj in Figure 1 shifts the “total harvest” curve upwards. Point B lies outside the 
instinct  growth curve,  which implies  that  the total  harvest  exceeds  the  rate  at  which 
resource  renews itself.  If  individuals  don’t  constrain their  harvest  following the  shock, 
resources will be diminished from R1 to R2. 
FIGURE 1. 
The sustainable level of resources. 
      The optimal maximum sustainable harvests is the largest harvests at the maximum 
sustainable growth jR

. The maximum sustainable growth requires that 0=∂
∂
jt
j
R
R , which 
implies jR

=K/2. The maximum sustainable harvests, corresponding to this resource level, 
is  equal  to  jYˆ =r*K/4.  If  resources  are  below the  maximum sustainable  growth,  it  is 
optimal for individuals to constraint their harvests to give resources the time to renew 
itself and reach the optimal level. On the other hand, if resources  Rjt exceeds jR

,  it is 
optimal  to  harvest  the  excess  of  resources  above  the  optimal  level  (Rjt- jR

),  and  the 
renewal rate of resources jtR in the subsequent periods. 
The  maximum  sustainable  harvests  by  each  individual  (invoking  symmetry  of 
harvests) in the absence of weather shocks equals to n
K
rx jijt /)( 4
= . 
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We analyze  now,  the  question  over  the  optimal  harvest  level  at  time t in  the 
presence of weather shocks. In time t, payoffs are equal to:
∑
=
=
T
t
ijtij xU
1
              if   1>ijR   for all t      
0=ijU                              otherwise.   (4). 
This can be rewritten as:
∑
=
=
T
t
ijtjij xRPU
1
)·(  (5)
 Where P(Rj) captures the probability that a group will not collapse. We will not 
specify its functional form, however ],[)( 10∈jRP  and 0>∂∂ RRP j /)( . Again it is 
important to emphasize that payoffs are equal to 0 if resources fall below 1. This can be 
interpreted as the minimum harvests below which a group does not have sufficient 
nutrition to survive.
Assuming no discounting of future payoffs, the value of harvests for player i at time 
t, satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation. Based on (Antoniadou et al., 
2013):
)()(')()( jtjtijttijjtijt RERVUERV += (6)
where )()/()( jtijtjtjtjt EnxKRrRRE θ−−−= 1  is the growth rate of resources, and E(Uijt) is 
the expected utility at time t
The first-order condition for a maximum is:
)(' jtijt RV =n 
ijt
ijt
x
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∂
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       (7)
We apply the envelop theorem to 6, which yields:
)(' jtijt RV  = - 
jt
ijt
R
UE
∂
∂ )(
+ )('' jtijt RV · jtR + )(' jtijt RV
jt
jt
R
R
∂
∂ 
       (8) 
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After substituting 7 into 8, we derive the optimal level of resources to be harvested 
harvested (see appendices for computations):
n
RPRPKRrEKRrR
n
x
x jtjtjtjtjt
T
t
ijt
ijt
])(')([]·)([)]()([
*
1211
2
1 −−+−−+
−
=
∑
=
θ  (9).
Weather shocks affect in three ways the harvesting path. First, individuals reduce 
their harvesting proportionally to the expected weather shock  )(θE . Second, individuals 
decrease their harvest levels if r(1-2Rjt/K) - 1 <0, as P(R)/P'(R) >0. This is the case of 
the experiment (see Table 1 for parameter values). Third, individuals reduce their harvest 
levels in the long term, once they accumulate profits as ∑
=
≥
T
t
ijtx
1
0  . Consequently, weather 
shocks enhance resource conservation.
3. The experimental design 
In  this  paper  we  test  experimentally  the  effects  of  weather  shocks  diminishing 
resources  on  individual  harvests.  In  the  experiment  a  group  of  150  students  at  the 
University of Vienna were asked to harvest resources from the common-pool of resources. 
The  students  were  divided  into  6  different  sessions,  corresponding  to  six  different 
treatments. During each session, students were divided further into 5 groups. Each group 
harvested resources from its own common pool of resources. Before the actual experiment, 
students  were asked to answer some questions to determine their social preferences, risk 
aversion, and cognitive abilities (these questions are shown in the appendices). They were 
also given the opportunity to learn dynamics of the game in the 10 trial periods preceding 
the  actual  experiment.  After  the  trial  period,  students  were  re-matched  to  form new 
groups. 
The actual experiment lasted for 41 periods. The average earnings were 13.58 € per 
hour.  Students  were  not  informed about  the  duration  of  the  experiment.  In  the  first 
treatment,  students  had  to  decide  each  time  period  how  much  resources  to  harvest. 
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Afterwards resources were diminished by their total harvests (equation 1) and re-grew 
according to equation (2). The instructions contained Figure 2, which illustrates re-growth 
of resources, depending on the amount of resources in the common pool. We will refer to 
this session as the baseline (BL) treatment. In two other treatments, resources could be 
diminished by a weather shock occurring with the probability  p after the re-growth of 
resources. We distinguish here between the Mild Weather treatment (MW) and the Severe 
Weather treatment (SW). In the Mild Weather treatment, the probability and intensity of 
weather shocks are less severe than in the Severe Weather treatment (see Table 1). We 
repeated each treatment (BL, MW, SW) in the presence of costly sanctions. We will refer 
to the baseline treatment with punishment as Only Punishment (OP), to the treatment 
with mild weather shocks and punishment as Interaction Mild (IM), and to the treatment 
with  severe  weather  shocks  and  punishment  as  Interaction  Strong  (IS).  In  those 
treatments, students could decide to spend some of their harvests on reducing harvests of 
others, after observing how much resource others harvested in their group. Participants, 
who were punished, lost twice as much of harvests as resources spend on punishment. 
Appendices contain the concrete instructions for each treatment.
TABLE 1. 
Parameter values 
Baseline
 (BL)
Mild  Weather 
(MW)
Strong Weather
(SW)
K 80
Rt=0 45
r 0.1
n 5
p 0 0.2 0.25
α 0 0.2 1
β 0 2.2 4
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FIGURE 2. 
Re-growth of resources 
4. Results
In this section, we present results from our experiment. In Section 4.1, we compare 
results at the group level between treatments. Section 4.2 presents results from the panel 
regression  analysis  of  individual  data.   Section  4.3  shows  a  brief  analysis  of  the 
characteristics  of  survivors.  A  summary  of  the  variables  used  can  be  found  in  the 
appendices.
4.1 Total harvests  
Summary statistics of the results from the experiment are presented in Table 2. The 
table compares the average survival time, i.e. how long groups harvest resources before 
resources become exhausted or the experiment ends (in 41st period); the probability of 
resource exhaustion; the average harvest over 41 periods and harvests in 41st period in 
groups which survived till the end of the experiment; and the average harvests in the 1 st 
period in all groups. 
The  probability  of  resources  exhaustion  increases  with  the  severity  of  weather 
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shocks (see first column in Table 2). This can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact 
that shocks diminish resources and bring them closer to their ecological limits. On the 
other  hand,  weather  shocks  induce  individuals  to  overharvest  resources  in  the  initial 
periods of the experiment (see the last column in Table 2). This may be caused by the fact 
that resource uncertainty is perceived as a risk of loss of future payoffs, causing individuals 
to harvest more resources to compensate for such risk. 
The  probability  of  resource  exhaustion  is  higher  in  the  presence  of  costly 
sanctioning, compared to treatments with no possibility to punish others, given the same 
frequency and intensity of weather shocks (with the exception of mild shocks). This result 
seems paradoxical:  we expected that the possibility to impose sanctions on individuals 
overharvesting resources would lower the probability of resource exhaustion. However, our 
results suggest that subjects may perceive punishment as an addition (to environmental) 
risk of loss of future payoffs, causing them to behave more selfishly and harvest initially 
more  resources.  This  result  is  in  line  previous  studies,  which  show  that  spatial  and 
temporal dynamics reduce effectiveness of punishment (Janssen and Anderies, 2013). There 
is  also  some evidence  that  punishment can lead to a significant  payoff  loss  and limit 
successful  self-governance  (Herrmann,  et  al.,  2008;  Gahter  and  Herrmann,  2011).  In 
particular,  Herrmann  et  al.  (2008)  show  that  punishment  is  only  beneficial  if 
complemented by strong social norms of cooperation. Otherwise, participants are likely to 
punish not only free-riders, but also cooperators, referred to in the literature as anti-social 
punishment. Rand and Nowak (2011) argue that selection can favor substantial levels of 
antisocial punishments for a wide range of parameter settings.
Table 2 compares the average harvests in 41st period and over 41 periods among 
groups which prevented resource exhaustion. We find that groups, which were given the 
possibility to punish others, accumulated more harvests over the entire experiment, given 
the same intensity of weather shocks. Sanctioning initially causes individual to harvest 
more, yet over time it became effective in inducing individuals to conserve resources. Our 
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results from panel regressions of individual data in the next section confirm these results. 
The average harvests in the first period was 22.57 among groups which collapsed before 
the end of the experiment and 13.64 in groups which survived till the end of experiment. 
This supports that initial harvests determine the probability of resource exhaustion. 
TABLE 2. 
Summary statistics across different treatments 
Theaverage 
survival time
 
Collapse 
Prob.
The average harvests
 in 41st period
among survivors
  
The average
 harvests over 
41 time periods  
among survivors 
The average 
harvests
 in 1st period 
  
BL 36.8 1/5 0.58 1.67 14.8
OP 26.8 3/5 0.95 1.78 16.32
WM 24.2 3/5 0.1 1.33 21.1
IM 21.8 3/5 0.5 1.63 20.76
WS 16.4 4/5 0.2 1.56 18.18
IS 10 5/5 0 0 26.4
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate dynamics of resources and total harvests over time for the 
different treatments. All groups, with the exception of one group in the baseline treatment, 
start by overharvesting resources.
The figure shows that most groups are unable to maintain resources at the optimal 
level. Only one group in the baseline treatment was successful at achieving the optimal 
path of extraction. On the other hand two groups have been able to reverse the negative 
trend of diminishing resources. Members of these groups constraint their harvests so as to 
allow  resources  to  re-new  itself  over  many  periods.  The  actions  of  the  group  in  IM 
treatment  are in  line  with the theoretical  predictions.  In  three other  groups,  resource 
dynamics exhibit a downward trend because of overharvesting by group members. Brandt 
at  al.  (2012)  suggest  that  unsustainable  harvests  may  be  a  results  of  decreasing 
expectation and diminishing payoffs, which result in a low cooperation. Individuals, who 
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expect low payoffs because of low productivity of resources, are less likely to conserve 
them. Diminishing resources can be also explained by the shifting baseline syndrome. The 
effect goes back to Pauly (1995), who observes that degradation of the environment can 
lower  standards  of  what  is  perceived  to  be  the  normal  state  of  nature.  As  a  result, 
individuals often fail to conserve resources so as to allow resources to recover from weather 
shocks. Instead they accept the degraded resources as their new reference point.  
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4.2 Individual harvests 
In this section, we present results from the panel regression with the dependent 
variable:  individual  harvests.  We included as  independent  variables:  resources,  weather 
shock and punishment received in the previous period, as well as the standard deviation of 
harvests  in  the  previous  period  so  as  to  explore  the  impact  of  social  inequalities  on 
harvesting strategies. In addition, we included two dummies for  treatments with weather 
shocks and punishment, one dummy for surviving groups and its  interaction with the 
punishment  received  in  the  previous  period.  Table  4  reports  results  from 5  estimated 
models.  Model  1  represents  results  from the regression with all  independent variables. 
Model  3  studies  the  effects  of  independent  variables  on  harvesting  during  the  first  5 
periods, i.e. before any of groups collapsed. Model 4 examines how results change after the 
14 period. We choose 14th period as a benchmark, as our initial analysis indicated that only 
after 14th period weather shocks have a significant effect on harvesting. 
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TABLE 3. 
Dependent variable: harvests by individuals 
Model 1
Model 2
If period<6
Model 3 
if  period> 14
Model 4
IMWM
Model 5
IS
WS
Resources-1 0.046***
(0.002)
0.071***
(0.007)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.075***
(0.05)
0.05***
(0.001)
Weather Shock-1 -0.004
(0.01)
-0.019
(0.06)
-0.018**
(0.008)
0.043**
(0.018)
0.003
(0.017)
Punishment 
(received) -1
-0.021**
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.021)
0.4
(0.33)
-0.17***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
Standard deviation
of harvests – 1
0.27***
(0.02)
0.22*
(0.05)
0.17*
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.05)
Survivor -0,45***
(0.06)
-0.93***
(0.18)
0.00
(0.02)
Punishment 
(received) – 1 · 
Survivor
-0.299***
(0.05)
-0.2
(0.12)
-0.63*
(0.33)
Dummy Weather 0.106*
(0.59)
0.0533
(0.155)
-0,008
(0,016)
Dummy 
Punishment
0.049
(0.06)
0.3**
(0.14)
0.022
(0.016)
Constant -0.03
(0.07)
-0.30
(0.18)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.29***
(0.01)
-0.17***
(0.03)
N obs
N individuals 
3000
150
 600
150
1590
75
1495
50
670
50
R2 within
between
overall
0.42
0.29
0.30
0.43
0.03
0.31
0.09
0.72
0.31
0.15
0.31
0.22
0.05
0.13
0.13
 Note: (1)-(3) Entries are panel data coefficients with random effects and AR(1) disturbance. (4) (5) Entries are panel 
data coefficients with fixed effects and AR(1) disturbance.  Standard deviations below. *** p< .01; ** p < .05; * p <0.1. 
two-tailed test.
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Resources 
In all versions of the model, individuals harvest more, the more resources there are 
available to the group. Consistently with our expectations, the sign corresponding to the 
variable past resources is positive and significant. This can be explained by the fact that 
the larger the stock of resources, the higher their renewal rate, which allows individuals to 
harvest more if resources are below their maximum growth rate (K/2). This in fact occurs 
in all groups after the second period. Initially resources available to the group are equal to 
45, thus above  K/2=40. However, in the first period the average harvests are equal to 
17.67, bringing resources well below their maximum renewal rate. In addition, the less 
resources,  the closer resources to its ecological limits.  This increases the probability of 
resource exhaustion, which explains the positive sign of  the coefficients for the size of 
resources.  
Weather shocks
We find that in the late part of the experiment (after period 14) the more severe the 
weather shocks are, the more likely environmental uncertainty is to induce individual to 
conserve resources. This contrast with the results from preceding studies by Rapoport and 
co-authors, who show that resource uncertainty leads to more selfish behavior. In their 
model, which distinguishes our approach from Rapoports’ and others, harvesting decisions 
have  no  impact  on  resource  growth.  In  our  experiment,  weather  shocks  increase  the 
probability of resource exhaustion. We find that the closer resources to its ecological limits, 
the more likely weather shocks encourage resource conservation. In favor of this hypothesis, 
results from model 2 suggests that weather shocks have no significant impact on harvests 
in the initial periods. Instead, weather shocks have a positive and significant impact on 
resource conservation after  the 14th period, i.e. when resources are already significantly 
diminished.  
Results  from  Model  4,  where  the  estimated  sample  included  data  from  two 
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treatments MW and IM, suggests that mild weather shocks have a significant effect on 
harvests. On the other hand, in Model 5, where the sample included data from treatments 
in  the presence of  severe weather shocks (IS and SW), weather  shocks do not  induce 
individuals  to  conserve  their  harvests.  It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  the  positive 
impact of uncertainty on resource conservation often came too late: many groups collapsed 
in  the presence of  severe weather  shocks because resource uncertainty induce them to 
overharvest  resources  in  the  beginning  of  the  experiment  significantly  diminishing  the 
resource stock.
Punishment 
Since the seminal papers by Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom et al. (1992), substantial 
experimental evidence has shown that people are willing to punish defectors in common 
pool resource and public goods dilemmas at the costs to themselves. We find that the 
frequency of punishment increases with more severe weather shocks. In particular, in the 
treatment with severe weather shocks (IS), individuals punish others substantially. The 
imposed penalties often exceeded the extraction levels of individuals. This is because many 
individuals were willing to punish over-harvesters simultaneously, which led to significant 
payoff  loss.  Reducing  harvests  of  others  below  what  they  harvested  happened  only 
occasionally in other treatments (OP, IM).
In general, we find that costly sanctioning induces individuals to conserve resources 
(Model 1). However, the positive effect of sanctioning can be only observed in late periods 
of the experiment (Model 3), while it is insignificant in its early periods (Model 2). This  
may suggest that the effectiveness of punishment depends on the probability of resource 
exhaustion.  As  resources  get  closer  to  their  ecological  limits,  which  increases  the 
probability of resources exhaustion, the possibility to punish others significantly decreases 
individual harvests. In particular, results from Model 3 show that after the 14h period, 
punishments  has  a  significant  and  negative  impact  on  harvesting.  Alternatively,  these 
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results can be explained by the fact that individuals in groups which survive after the 14 th 
period are more likely to be receptive to punishment. In the presence of severe weather 
shocks, punishment turned out to be insignificant for encouraging resource conservation 
(Model 5). Here, the average survival period is 10 (Table 2). Thus, no group survived long 
enough so that punishment could reveal its positive effect on resource conservation. 
Standard deviation of harvests  
We find the standard deviation of harvests in the previous period have a significant 
and positive impact on individual harvests in models (1)-(3). These results can reflect the 
inequity aversion. Falk et al. (2000) show that a simple model of fairness explains many 
stylized facts of common-pool resource experiments. In particular, the authors show that 
the  subjects  are  likely  to  act  conditionally  on  what  other  subject  do:  if  others  are 
cooperative they would conserve resources, while if others are hostile they retaliate. Along 
this  line,  in  many public  good  experiments,  people  contributed  more  to  experimental 
goods, the more others contribute, which has been referred to as “crowing in” (Bardsley 
and Sausgruber, 2005; Velez et al.,  2008). Similarly, in our experiment, individuals are 
likely to adjust their extraction levels to match the average extraction of others, even at 
the price of increasing the probability of resource exhaustion.
4.3 Survivors
In this section, survivor groups are defined as those  groups which did not 
collapse during the entire experiment. Individuals who belong to surviving groups have 
different harvesting strategies than those groups which collapsed. First, they harvest less in 
early stages of the experiment (Model 2). As discussed in Section 3,  harvesting levels in 
early periods are essential for survival. Second, surviving individuals are more sensitive to 
punishment than the other participants. In particular, model 1 shows that the interaction 
between Punishment received and survivor has a significant and negative on harvesting. 
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For each unit of punishment received; these individuals adapt more their behavior. Joffily 
et al. (2011) have shown that receiving punishment triggers negative emotions and those 
with most negative emotions adjust more their behavior in the direction of cooperation. 
We conduct  a probit  regression on the probability of  surviving given some group and 
individual variables. The next table shows the results:
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TABLE 4.
Dependent variable: Survivor =1.
Model 6
Reciprocity 0.18 ***(0.03)
Male 0.63 ***(0.17)
Political orientation 
(Left-winger)
0.23 **
(0.10)
Group Political orientation 
Stand. Dev.
-1.87 **
(0.89)
Group Minimum IQ 2.05 **(0.73)
Treatment with Mild Weather -0.82 (0.74)
Treatment with Strong Weather -4.35 ***(1.37)
Treatment with Punishment -1.00(0.71)
Constant -0.30(1.28)
Num of Obs. 150
R2 0.52
Note: Entries are probit coefficients with clustered by group standard deviations below. *** p< .01; ** p < .05; * p <0.1. 
for two-tailed t-student test with 22 degrees of freedom.
Reciprocity.
Positive reciprocity is the extent to which an individual behaves in a nicer and more 
cooperative way as a response to a friendly action (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Table 4 
shows that survivors have a higher positive reciprocity.  This can be explained by the fact 
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that individuals over-contribute in public good games because they include the earnings of 
others in their own utility functions (Coleman, 1984; Van Dijk and Van Winden, 1997). 
Also in common-pool resources dilemmas, more other-regarding individuals harvest lower 
quantities (Chermak and Krause, 2002; Burton, 2003; Maldonado et al., 2003). Because of 
their low harvesting levels, more other-regarding individuals enjoy higher surviving rates. 
This circumstance may explain the evolution of group-beneficial behaviors (Boyd et al, 
2003, Safarzynska 2013).
Gender
The evidence on gender difference in experiments on social dilemmas is not 
conclusive. There is no clear evidence that female participant are more other-regarding 
than males in social dilemmas (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). It seems that small differences 
in experimental design and implementation are the drivers of these differences (Chermak 
and Krause 2002). In our experiment, participants played a dictator game in order to 
estimate other-regarding preferences of participants. In the dictator game, both males and 
females behave similarly. Also, male and female participants score the same in the IQ test.
Political Orientation (individual and group level)
The importance of political affiliation for the level of resources harvested in 
common-pool dilemmas has been shown in the seminal [??] experiment by Chermak and 
Krause (2002). In particular, they show that individuals without political affiliation tend 
to harvest more resources. In this paper, we measure political affiliation on a scale which 
varies from 1 (very right) to 7 (very left). We find that left-wingers are more likely to 
survive in our experiment. This goes in line with Putterman et al. (2010) who found that 
in public game experiments, left-wingers tend to contribute more. In addition, we find that 
groups are more likely to survive when their members are more politically alike. Groups 
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with member who share common values manage their collective resources more successfully 
(Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). They are also able to better solve coordination problems 
(Sugden, 1984).
Group Minimum IQ
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are asked to solve four 
mathematical problems. This variable equals the number of mathematical questions solved 
correctly by the individual of each group who solved the fewest. Table 4 shows that lower 
IQ translates into a lower probability of group survival. It has been so far that low 
cognitive skills are linked with fewer contributions in repeated public goods, especially at 
early stages of the experiment (Putterman et al, 2010, Jones, 2011). These early harvesting 
decisions are essential for the survival of the group survival (see Section 3).
5. Conclusions 
The impact of uncertainty on strategic behavior in common-pool resource dilemmas 
is not yet adequately understood. This relates to the fact that such games are difficult to 
analyze analytically: resource dynamics and social interactions create complex dynamics, 
where strategies depend not only on own past choices, but also on choices made by others. 
To better grasp how resource uncertainty affects harvesting strategies and the evolution of 
costly punishment, we conducted an experiment where weather shocks diminish resources. 
Weather shocks are drawn from the known distribution with the certain probability. 
Our  results  are  in  contrast  to  the  evidence  from  conventional  common-pool 
experiments. In particular, the preceding studies have shown that uncertainty over the size 
of resources is likely to induce individuals to behave more selfishly and to harvest more, 
while costly punishment can encourage resource conservation. On the other hand, results 
from our experiment suggest that severe weather shocks induce individuals to conserve 
resources  in  the  long  run.  However,  the  positive  impact  of  uncertainty  on  resource 
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conservation often comes too late. Individuals are likely to start to conserve resources when 
resources become scarce. As a result, many groups collapsed in the presence of weather 
shocks because of overharvesting resources in the beginning of the experiment. This can be 
explained by the fact that uncertainty causes individuals to initially overharvest resources 
to account for the risk of loss of future payoffs. 
The  probability  of  resource  exhaustion  turned  out  to  critically  depend  on  the 
harvests in the first period. Surprisingly, allowing for the possibility to punish others at the 
cost  to  one  self-induced  individuals  to  overharvest  resources  in  the  beginning  of  the 
experiment compared to the situation when costly sanctioning was not feasible. This may 
relate to the fact that individuals perceive punishment as an additional risk of loss of 
future payoffs. 
Our research carries the implication for climate change debate. Some economists 
argue that once the environmental pressure is sufficiently strong, the market will bring the 
sustainable  solution,  and  thus  climate  policies  should  not  dominate  policy  discourse. 
However, results from our experiment suggest that the positive impact of environmental 
pressure  on  individual  behavior  is  likely  to  come  too  late  to  prevent  damage  to  the 
environment. In addition, our research suggests that institutions such as sanctions can 
actually speed up global warming initially, as individuals foreseeing that their payoffs will 
be reduced by sanctions, consume more to account for the risk of loss of future payoffs. 
Finally, we have seen how different individuals react differently to the same institutional 
framework,  depending in  their  intrinsic  characteristics.  This  alerts  us to the fact  that 
universal well-functioning institutions may be hard to develop.
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APPENDIX 1
Theoretical derivations
Recall, the first-order condition for a maximum is:
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We apply the envelop theorem to 6, which yields:
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APPENDIX 2
Variable description
Variable description
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
  Resources     |   3150    13.36219    13.18302   1.018642         45
  Weather -1    |   3150    .1514286    .5499989          0        3.8
  Punishment -1 |   3150    .1754921    1.126593          0         20
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
 Sd Harvest -1|      600    .4152174     .749321          0    4.09878
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
   Politics  |       150        4.37    1.331636          1          7
 Reciprocity |       150    5.533333     2.60012          0         11
        Male |       150    .5666667    .4971957          0          1
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
       IQMin |        30          .6    .6214555          0          2
 Sd Politics |        30    1.087974    .3870224   .4483084   2.044601
    Survivor |        30    .3666667    .4901325          0          1
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INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions 
and decisions made by others, you may be able to earn a substantial amount of money.
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, we will ask you to answer some 
questions, which will appear on your screen. Once everybody has answered them, we will 
distribute a set of instructions. Afterwards, the second part of the experiment will start, 
during which you can learn dynamics of the game. The third part - of the actual 
experiment - will follow afterwards with some additional elements. This part will last much 
longer than the second part. We will distribute instructions for this part prior to its 
beginning.
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Part 2
This is a trial part of the experiment, during which you will have a chance to learn 
dynamics of the game. You will be matched with 4 other participants. You will not know 
who is who in your group during or after the experiment.
You will be asked to collect tokens from the common pool of tokens. Your group starts 
with the common pool of 45 tokens. 
Every member of your group, included yourself, will decide simultaneously on the number 
of tokens to collect. The number of tokens collected by each person cannot exceed 20% of 
all tokens available to the group. You will be informed about how many tokens were 
collected by others in your group. The decisions of group members will be displayed in a 
random order every period - it will not be possible to determine specifically who collected 
how many tokens.
The total number of tokens collected by the group will be subtracted from the common 
pool of tokens. Then, depending on the number of tokens left in the common pool, there 
will be a re-growth in the number of tokens (RG), according to:
RG=0.1*TC*(1-TC/80),
where TC is the number of tokens in the pool, and 80 is the maximum carrying capacity of 
the pool of tokens, i.e. beyond which the number of tokens will not increase further. 
The graph below illustrates an increase in the number of tokens (RG) in the common pool, 
depending on the number of tokens in the common pool (TC): 
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For instance, if the number of tokens in the common pool is 40, then the expected re-
growth of tokens is 2, and there will be 42 tokens available to your group in the next 
period. 
You will be asked to collect tokens for some periods.  However, this part of the experiment 
may also end if the number of tokens in the common pool of tokens goes below 1 [one]. In 
this case, everyone is your group loses all their tokens.
Your Earnings:
The aim of this part of the experiment is to give you the opportunity to learn dynamics of 
the game. You will not earn money. 
Timing:
There is another important note. You will have a limited but a sufficient amount of time 
(some seconds) to decide how many tokens to collect. If you exceed this time, the decision 
will be taken for you.
Before starting:
In order to check if you understand these instructions, please answer the questions which 
will appear on your screen. 
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Part 3
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to collect tokens for many periods - just 
as you did before. You will be randomly matched with 4 other participants, thus you will 
interact with different players than in the previous part of the experiment. In addition, 
there is the possibility of a random event occurring, which can be thought of as a shock 
destroying tokens in the common pool.
The random event: 
In this part of the experiment, there is 25% of chances that your group will lose between 1 
and 4 tokens due to a random event.
You will be informed whether your group lost some tokens before the beginning of the next 
period.
Your Earnings:
Your earnings will be equal to the number of tokens, which you collected. Each token is 
worth 1,2 Euro.
There is, nevertheless, an exception: if the number of tokens in the common token pool 
goes below 1 [one], everyone in your group will lose their tokens. In this case, your earnings 
will be zero in this part of the experiment.
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Part 3
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to collect tokens for many periods - just 
as you did before. You will be randomly matched with 4 other participants, thus you will 
interact with different players than in the previous part of the experiment. In addition, you 
will be allowed to reduce tokens collected by other group members at the cost to yourself.
Reductions:
After everyone decides how many tokens to collect, you will be allowed to reduce the 
number of tokens collected by others. You will see the number of tokens collected by 
others, and under it, a box where you can indicate how many tokens you want to spend on 
reducing tokens of others. For each token, which you spend on reducing tokens of someone 
in your group, it will make him/her lose twice as much. Other members of your group can 
decide to reduce your tokens.
If you lose tokens in a period, they will be deducted from tokens which you accumulated in 
other periods. 
Your Earnings:
Your earnings will be equal to the number of tokens, which you collected. Each token is 
worth 1,2 Euro.
There is, nevertheless, an exception: if the number of tokens in the common token pool 
goes below 1 [one], everyone in your group will lose their tokens. In this case, your earnings 
will be zero in this part of the experiment.
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Part 3
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to collect tokens for many periods - just 
as you did before. You will be randomly matched with 4 other participants; thus you will 
interact with different players than in the previous part of the experiment. In addition, you 
will be allowed to reduce tokens collected by other group members at the cost to yourself. 
There is also the possibility of a random event occurring, which can be thought of as a 
shock destroying tokens in the common pool.
Reductions:
After everyone decides how many tokens to collect, you will be allowed to reduce the 
number of tokens collected by others. You will see the number of tokens collected by 
others, and under it, a box where you can indicate how many tokens you want to spend on 
reducing tokens of others. For each token, which you spend on reducing tokens of someone 
in your group, it will make him/her lose twice as much. Other members of your group can 
decide to reduce your tokens.
If you lose tokens in a period, they will be deducted from tokens which you accumulated in 
other periods. 
The random event: 
In this part of the experiment, there is the possibility that the number of tokens in the 
common pool will be reduced by a random event. Precisely, there is 25% of chances that 
your group will lose between 1 and 4 tokens.
You will be informed whether your group lost some tokens before the beginning of the next 
period.
Your Earnings:
Your earnings will be equal to the number of tokens, which you collected. Each token is 
worth 1,2 Euro.
There is, nevertheless, an exception: if the number of tokens in the common token pool 
goes below 1 [one], everyone in your group will lose their tokens. In this case, your earnings 
will be zero in this part of the experiment.
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Part 3
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to collect tokens for many periods - just 
as you did before. You will be randomly matched with 4 other participants, thus you will 
interact with different players than in the previous part of the experiment. 
Your Earnings:
Your earnings will be equal to the number of tokens, which you collected. Each token is 
worth 1,2 Euro.
There is, nevertheless, an exception: if the number of tokens in the common token pool 
goes below 1 [one], everyone in your group will lose their tokens. In this case, your earnings 
will be zero in this part of the experiment.
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APPENDIX 4
Measurement of other-regarding preferences, IQ and risk aversion
MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES.
You have the chance to donate some money to an environmental NGO.
You have 1 Euro. Howe many cents (from 0 to 100) would you donate:
DICTATOR GAME 
You are matched with another person in this room.  You have 1 Euro, which you can share with 
this person. How many cents would you keep for yourself?
MEASUREMENT OF POSITIVE RECIPROCITY
Imagine that the person, with whom you were matched, proposed different divisions of the Euro.
Would you give 30 cents to this person, at a cost of 10 cents to you, if that person had split the 
previous euro in the following way?
COGNITIVE SKILLS (IQ)
You have 20 seconds to respond to the following questions. For each right answer you earn 20 
cents.
a) Which number comes next?
3, 5, 8, 13, 21, …
b) Which number is missing?
1 4 3
5 9 4
4 5 …
c) Which number comes next?
4, 54, 654, …
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b) Which number is missing?
17 8 5 4
13 7 5 4
10 6 4 ...
1. RISK AVERSION:
Now we want to ask you to choose in which of the following lotters you would like to participate
You can decide to participate in lottery A or lottery B.
Each lottery results in a monetary reward (€) with some probability (%).
Please indicate which lottery you would prefer.
A: 70% of 1.00 €, 30% of 0.80€
B: 70% of 1.90€, 30% of 0.05€
A: 50% of 1.00 €, 50% of 0.80€
B: 50% of 1.90€, 50% of 0.05€
A: 40% of 1.00 €, 60% of 0.80€
B: 40% of 1.90€, 60% of 0.05€
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APPENDIX 5
Questionnaire
Are you: (Male /Female)
Nationality
Are you a undergraduate student or a master student
In you are an undergraduate student, in which year of study are you currently? (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Which is your major: (Economics / Business, Management / A Social Science / Natural Science, 
Mathematics, etc, / Art, Language, Humanities / Others)
How would you describe the income of your parents from 1 to 7 where 1 = low and 7 = high
How much money do you spend every moth (apartment, food, clothes...)?
How would you describe your political outlook from 1 to 7 where 1 = very right-wing and 7 = very 
left-wing?
How often do you recycle paper? (Never / Not often / Sometimes /Always)
How often do you recycle glass? (Never / Not often / Sometimes /Always)
How often do you use a car? ( Less than once a week / Once or twice a week / Almost everyday / 
Everyday)
Do you turn off electronic devices once you are not using them? (Never/ Rarely/ Often/ Always)
How often do you buy new durable goods (clothes, computers, mobile phones)? (When new 
products appear on the market. / When the current product looks old / When the current 
product looks old is damaged a bit / When the current product is completely destroyed)
How often do you buy organic food? (Never/ Rarely/ Often/ Always)
How much do you know about environmental issues (pollution, sustainability...)? (I do not know 
much / I know something / I have a good knowledge / I have a deep knowledge)
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